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Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, 
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Management from an Institutional Perspective
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Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark and Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
OLAV JULL SØRENSEN
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
The study focuses on TNCs’ sociopolitical legitimation in Bangladesh, 
India, and Pakistan with a view to ensuring sustainability in the 
greater institutional context. Taking an institutional perspective 
as a theoretical lens, using a grounded theory methodology, and 
employing nine cases as a methodological tool, the study explores 
and conceptualizes three types of sentiments. They are abbreviated 
as “REN-sentiments,” and cause tensions between TNCs and socio-
political actors in the process of legitimation. The REN-sentiments 
comprise “religiosity and ideology,””nationalism and patriotism,” 
and “ecological balance,” and suggest that tensions stemming from 
these sentiments can be managed and often turned into opportu-
nities if appropriate strategies are applied. Eight types of strategic 
choices derived from the nine case studies are presented in order 
to mitigate, manage, and cash in on the REN-sentiments in South 
Asian markets. Such strategies include collaboration strategy, local 
development strategy, strategy of alignment with sociopolitical 
actors, local name and staffing strategy, hibernation strategy, senti-
ment-focused strategy, isomorphism strategy, and openness strategy.
KEYWORDS institution, sentiment, sociopolitical  legitimation, 
South Asia, strategies and sustainability, TNC international 
management
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INTRODUCTION
International business (IB) has embraced the institutional view in theoretical 
and strategic frameworks (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008, 2009, 2010; Peng, 2004; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). However, 
sociopolitical legitimation of transnational corporations (TNCs) as part of 
the institutional view still has not been sufficiently investigated (see Turcan, 
Marinova, & Rana, 2012).
The “social institutional view” (e.g., Busenitz & Spencer, 2000; Chan & 
Makino, 2007; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Orr & Scott, 
2008; Whitley, 1992) suggests that regulative, normative, and cognitive insti-
tutions affect business practices and economic performances in cross-border 
situations. Within this area of institutional research, terms such as “liabilities 
of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995), “institutional distance” (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002), “institutional idiosyncrasies” (Henisz, 2003), and “institutional 
void” (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005) are increasingly common. Although 
there is considerable variation in terms and rubrics, these studies typically 
lay out a general hypothesis about the main assertion (i.e., big question)of 
IB, as Peng, (2004) claims: that difference between cultures or social institu-
tions impede or stimulate the success of cross-societal ventures (Orr & Scott, 
2008). Business system literatures show how the institutional conditions and 
the nature of business systems shape the structures and strategies of TNCs 
in which they operate (Morgan, Kristensen, & Whitley, 2001; Whitley, 1992, 
2007). Despite increasing use of the institutional view in IB, studies have 
paid limited attention to understanding cognitive institutions, particularly 
sentiments, and the way they affect firms’ legitimation in cross-border social 
contexts. Sentiments are important because they eventually lead firms to 
design appropriate strategies for earning and maintaining sustainability in a 
particular social context. Every society has distinct cognitive institutions that 
shape sentiments differently, affecting TNCs’ operations and sustainability 
differently. There are two major reasons that understanding society’s “senti-
ment” toward TNC management is important. One, relationships between 
TNCs, societies and government is becoming increasingly complex (Yamin & 
Sinkovics, 2007), particularly in emerging markets, where formal institutions 
are relatively weak but civil society and media are highly visible. The com-
plexity in these relationships is often manifested in the form of sentiments 
that causes tensions in TNC sustainability and management in South Asian 
sociopolitical markets. As a result, firms need to understand and address 
these sentiments through appropriate strategic approaches. Two, TNCs are 
socially accountable to global communities such as multilateral institutions 
and civil society actors (e.g., activist groups and NGOs) (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998; Kourula & Laasonen, 2010), in addition to host institutions. These 
actors continuously scrutinise the behavior of TNCs and thereby influence 
societies to form sentiments at the national, supra-national, and global levels.
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64 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
One study of Dawoo Corporations in Poland by Lee, Ghauri, and 
Hadjikhani (2007) explores the relationship between sociopolitical actors and 
TNCs and explains how firms managed to mitigate tensions that appeared 
in the sociopolitical environment. The study concludes that the legitimation 
of TNCs in the sociopolitical market is conditioned by trust (between actors 
and TNCs) and the commitment of the firms to social actors, in which a set 
of actors including enterprises, media, governments, specialists, and public 
opinion play roles. They argue that firms therefore need to have commitment 
to and strategic investment in these actors.
Working backward from the study by Lee et al. (2007), our study begins 
with an investigation of why sentiments that cause tension between TNCs 
and the sociopolitical market develop. By definition “sentiment” is an expres-
sion of view, opinion, and feeling (www.oxforddictionaries.com, 15.0513). 
On the basis of sentiments, people draw conclusions, express views, and 
make discourses with regard to TNCs’ behaviors, structures, and actions at 
individual, group, and institutional levels. This process is rooted in social 
institutions, most particularly in cognitive processes and states of mind. 
Thus, sentiments are good measure for understanding how one firm earns 
legitimation in a sociopolitical market while another experiences tension. 
The understanding process will lead us to different types of sentiments that 
cause different types of tensions. This understanding can help TNCs make 
different strategic choices and develop management capabilities to manage 
each type of sentiment differently.
The specific research questions of this study are: what are the senti-
ments that cause tensions for TNC legitimation in the sociopolitical markets 
of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan? How do TNCs manage to mitigate these 
tensions through strategic choices?
We first present a theoretical background in which institutions and 
legitimation of TNCs are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of the 
methodology used. Nine cases are then presented with a short analysis. 
A typology of the sentiment that affects TNCs’ sociopolitical legitimation, 
grounded in the cases, is then developed. Sentiments are conceptualized to 
understand why and how they play a role in creating tension. Based on anal-
ysis and conceptualizations we then present the strategic choices used by the 
TNCs to manage various types of sentiments that cause tensions for them in 
the sociopolitical market. A discussion of the conclusions of the study, fol-
lowed by implications and future research directions, is presented at the end.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The theoretical background of institutions and legitimacy presents the basic 
concepts that relate to TNC management. An understanding of these concepts 
will give the reader insight into the theoretical domain in which the study is 
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 Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 65
positioned. Moreover, this will help the reader understand the empirical sec-
tions and the typology of the sentiments; including how and why they affect 
the cross-border management of firms. However, since this is a theory-build-
ing study, it is not driven by the theoretical background presented; rather, it 
is inspired by the theory to see reality from an institutional perspective.
The literature on the institution is very extensive, and its origins go 
back to the development of the “early” and “neo” institutional views in 
the nineteenth century. However, IB has mainly been inspired by the neo-
institutional views of economics (Coase, 1937; Nelson & Winter, 1982; North, 
1990; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991), organizational science (Bourdieu, 
1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1991; Silverman, 1971), sociology (Bereger & 
Luckmann, 1966; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Donald, 1991; Greetz, 
1973; Rosenberg, 1979; Roy, 1997), and political science (Bonchek & Shepsle, 
1996; Moe, 1990; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). A general description of the neo-
institutional view and legitimacy in international business is presented below.
INSTITUTIONS
North (1990, pp. 4–5) argues, based on a game analogy, that institutions pro-
vide “rules of the game” and organizations act as the “players.” Organizations 
may well assist in constructing the rules, attempting to devise rules favorable 
to themselves, and they also may change the rules by political and other 
means. Williamson (1975, 1985) views organizations and their structures 
and procedures in such a way that institutions by their system design exer-
cise governance over production systems and minimize transaction costs. 
Thus, he emphasises the regulative and normative aspects of institutions. 
Sociologists like Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 345), Zucker (1983, p. 1), and 
Dobbin (1994, p. 118) focus on the cultural-cognitive aspects of institutions 
and insist that “rationalised organizational practices are essentially cultural, 
and are very much at the core of modern culture precisely because modern 
culture is organised around instrumental rationality” (Dobbin, 1994, p. 118). 
Therefore, institutions, by nature, are multifaceted, durable social structures 
made up of symbolic elements, social activities, metaphysical entities such as 
sentiments and values, and material resources. Institutions on the one hand 
impose restrictions by defining legal, moral, and cultural-cognitive boundar-
ies, and support and empower activities and actors on the other. Though 
institutions work to provide stability and order, they also undergo both incre-
mental and revolutionary change, and thus our subject must include not 
only institutions as “property” or “state of an existing social order,” but also 
institutions as “process.” As far as the process of institutionalization and dein-
stitutionalization is concerned, it is noteworthy that actors, including organi-
zations, coevolve institutions (Zettinig & Benson-Rea, 2008), and institutions 
reshape organizational structures and practices later (Whitley, 1992).
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66 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
Thus, institutional theory is concerned with regulatory, social, and cul-
tural influences that promote the survival and legitimacy of an organization 
rather than focus solely on efficiency-seeking behavior (Roy, 1997). As cited 
previously, these institutional forces are acknowledged in multiple works 
in sociology, organizational theory, political science, and economics, and 
have been definitively collected and summarized by Scott (2008) in his well-
known formulation of the three pillars of institutional forces. There are clear 
differences between the two theoretical viewpoints, the economics/political 
science branch and the sociology/organizational science branch. Therefore, 
we need to position our study in one of these views.
According to Bruton, Ashlstrom, and Li (2010), “the economic/political 
branch assumes that people make decisions based on the convenience and 
standardisation of rules and agreements, and thus the external institutions 
create structures for organisations” (p. 430), while the sociology/organiza-
tional theory branch assumes that “people make decisions based on heu-
ristics due to cognitive limitations and take action based on conventions 
and preconscious behavior. As a result, organizations adjust and conform 
to values and limits prescribed by society’s institutions” (p. 430). The latter 
emphasises social norms, shared cultures, cognitive scripts, and schemas 
instead of rules, regulations, and formal control, as the first does.
In this study we will use Scott’s (2008) approach to institutional theory, 
but focus on cognitive institutions only in accordance with the assumptions 
of the sociology/organizational theory branch. Scott’s three pillars, i.e., regu-
lative, normative, and cultural-cognitive systems, fall along a continuum from 
the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken 
for granted (Hoffman, 1997, p. 36). The best approach would be to view all 
these facets as contributing, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing facets 
that form a powerful social framework, one that encapsulates and exhibits 
the celebrated strength and resilience of these structures (Scott, 2008).
The regulative pillar derived from the studies in economics repre-
sents a rational actor model of behavior based on sanctions and conformity. 
Institutions guide behaviors by means of the rules of the game, monitoring, 
and enforcement (North, 1990) and thus business organizations or individu-
als need to seek legitimacy through conformity and compliance. However, 
the regulative components stem primarily from government legislation, 
industrial agreements, and standards. Although the concept of regulation 
invokes visions of repression and constraints, many types of regulations 
enable and assist social actors and action, conferring licenses, special pow-
ers, and benefits on some types of actors. Thus, institutions work both to 
constrain and empower social behavior (Scott, 2008).
The second institutional pillar is the normative one, which represents 
models of organizational and individual behavior based on prescriptive, 
evaluative, and obligatory dimensions of social life, professional interac-
tions, and organizational interactions (Scott, 2008; Bruton, 2010). Institutions 
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 Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 67
guide the behavior or actions of human beings vis-à-vis firms by defining 
what is appropriate or expected in various social and commercial situations. 
Normative systems are typically composed of values (what is preferred or 
considered appropriate in a given society) and norms (how things are to be 
done, consistent with those values) that subsequently establish consciously 
followed “ground rules” to which people tend to conform (Scott, 2007). This 
means that normative institutions exert influence through a social obligation 
to comply, and this is rooted in social expectations as to what an organiza-
tion or individual should be doing and how (March & Olsen, 1989). Some 
values and norms are applicable to all members of the collective groups, 
whereas others apply to selected types of actors or positions; the latter stan-
dards/norms give rise to roles in terms of specified positions. These beliefs 
are not simply anticipations or predictions, but prescriptions—normative 
expectations—of how specified actors are supposed to behave (Scott, 2008).
The cognitive pillar, the third set of institutions, is summarized by Scott 
(2007) and derived from the recent cognitive turn in social science (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). It represents models of individual behavior based on sub-
jectively constructed rules and meanings, which are gradually developed 
that limit appropriate beliefs and actions. This feature of neo-institutionalism 
may operate at the individual level in terms of culture and language (Carroll, 
1964; Scott, 2007). Others may be the taken-for-grantedness and precon-
scious behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1991). In the 
cognitive paradigm, what a creature (person) does is largely a function of the 
creature’s internal representation of its environment (D’Andrade, 1984:88). 
This pillar is becoming increasingly important to entrepreneurship and inter-
national business research in terms of how societies accept entrepreneurs 
and how transnational corporations inculcate values and even create a cul-
tural milieu whereby entrepreneurship and international management are 
accepted, encouraged, and sustained (Bosma, Acs, Autio, Coduras, & Levie, 
2009; Harrison, 2008; Li, 2009).
To understand or explain any human being’s action as a social reac-
tion, the analyst must consider not only the objective conditions, but also the 
actor’s subjective interpretation. Extensive research by psychologists over the 
past three decades has shown that cognitive frames enter into the full range 
of information-processing activities: from determining what information will 
receive attention; to how it will be encoded; to how it will be retained, 
retrieved, and organized into memory; to how it will be interpreted and 
understood. Thus, cognitive frames affect evaluations, judgments, predic-
tions, and inferences (see Markus & Zajonc, 1985).
Each of the three institutional pillars impacts firm legitimacy. They are 
assumed to be particularly important to understanding international manage-
ment and entrepreneurship in emerging economies (Peng & Zhou, 2005). 
Although both normative and cognitive institutional pillars draw on cul-
ture, there are differences between the two. The normative pillar represents 
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68 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
behavior and actions that organizations and individuals ought to take, as 
standards of behavior and commercial conventions. A normative evaluation 
of legitimacy concerns whether the organization’s activities and behavior are 
proper and consistent with influential groups’ standards, expectations, and 
societal norms (Suchman, 1995). The cognitive institutional pillar takes the 
form of scripts, schemas (one’s own understanding of the world that is con-
ditioned by personal experience, beliefs, and social values), and taken-
for-granted elements that influence individuals in a particular sociocultural and
political context (Bruton, 2010). A cognitive evaluation of legitimacy concerns 
the congruence between an organization and its sociocultural environment 
(Meyer & Scott, 1983). The institutional environment helps determine the pro-
cess of gaining cognitive and moral legitimacy, which are critical for organi-
zations (particularly international organizations) in overcoming the liabilities 
of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and of foreignness (Hymer, 1976) in order 
to increase survival prospects (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2001; Freeman, Carroll, 
& Hannan, 1983). Both entrepreneurial organizations and foreign organiza-
tions and their members/actors need to behave in a desirable or appropriate 
manner within a socially constructed system or they will face sanctions for 
deviating from the accepted norms (Schein, 2009; Suchman, 1995).
LEGITIMACY AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 
1995, p. 574). It reflects congruence between the behavior of legitimated 
firms and the shared beliefs of a group of legitimating actors (Chan & 
Makino, 2007), which Scott (2008) termed social acceptability and credibil-
ity. Therefore, legitimacy is a generalized rather than event-specific evalua-
tion and is “possessed objectively, yet created subjectively” (Suchman, 1995, 
p. 574). Legitimating actors are observers or constituents within the environ-
ment of a firm who determine whether the firm’s organizational activities are 
legitimate within a given institutional context, and who bestow social accep-
tance by supplying resources to legitimated firms so that they can sustain 
their operations in a competitive environment (Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995).
However, from an institutional perspective, legitimacy is not a commod-
ity or a resource to be possessed or exchanged, rather a condition reflecting 
perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, normative support, and 
alignment with the cultural-cognitive framework. There is always a ques-
tion as to whose assessments count in determining the legitimacy of a set 
of arrangements. Stinchcombe (1968, p. 162) asserts that “in the end, whose 
values define legitimacy is a matter of concerted social power; a power is 
legitimate to the degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which 
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 Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 69
it is justified. The power-holder can call upon sufficient other centres of 
power, as reserves in case of need, to make his power effective.”
According to Scott (2008, p. 61), “the three pillars elicit three related, 
but distinguishable bases of legitimacy.” The regulatory pillar emphasizes 
conformity to rule, i.e., legitimate organizations are those established by 
and operating in accordance with relevant legal or quasi-legal requirements. 
A normative conception stresses a deeper, moral base for assessing legiti-
macy. Hence, normative controls are much more likely to be internalized 
than regulative controls. And the incentives for conformity are likely to 
include intrinsic as well as extrinsic rewards. A cultural-cognitive view points 
to the legitimacy that comes from conforming to a common definition of the 
situation or frame of reference, a recognizable role or structural template 
that is often more difficult to achieve than regulative legitimacy (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 2008). The cultural-cognitive mode is the “deepest” level 
because it rests on preconscious, taken-for-granted understandings. It may 
lie between the normative and regulative domains as to the degree to which 
it can be observed and interpreted (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Organized 
sentiment may be the ultimate manifestation of this type of institution, which 
may evolve as an organized social network or activist group, and often takes 
action to oppose TNCs’ behavior. In international management, TNCs tend 
to obligatorily conform to external environmental differences and pressures 
in order to offset the uncertainty of newness and foreignness (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994), and thus they need to focus on sociopolitical and cognitive legitimacy 
for sustainability. Sociopolitical legitimacy is the extent to which macro-level 
stakeholders (i.e., government, the public, political and social groups, NGOs, 
and business associations) accept the venture as appropriate given the norms 
and values of the society and the “laws of the land.” Cognitive legitimation 
refers to the spread of knowledge about a new venture, and “one can assess 
cognitive legitimation by measuring the level of public knowledge about the 
venture activities” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994. p. 648). In contrast, sociopolitical 
legitimacy refers to the wider acceptance of the firm’s behavior and actions 
by the stakeholders in the society.
METHODOLOGY
Given the argument of Bamberger and Pratt (2010, p. 665) that IB is a con-
text-sensitive field, and researchers should use “unconventional research” 
methods, where “either or both the sample and context are unusual by 
today’s norms,” we have developed nine case studies based on longitu-
dinal secondary data collection methods (particularly historical methods) 
and interviews. Each case highlights critical tensions in the sociopolitical 
legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The purpose of 
the study is to develop a typology of the sentiments that cause tensions in 
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70 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
sociopolitical legitimation, grounded in the data from the nine case stud-
ies. We use grounded theory method (GT) to theorize the typology of the 
sentiment. A group of strategic choices is developed from the nine cases to 
understand how TNCs attempt to mitigate tensions with regard to sociopo-
litical legitimation. The idea of this research is to capture the reflections of 
sociopolitical actors who tend to influence the (cognitive) process of devel-
oping such sentiment in these societies, including media, the public, com-
mentators, civil society members, activists, and intellectuals. As a result, we 
have relied heavily on the media, secondary sources, and published cases, 
assuming that the “subjective views” of these actors have been reflected in 
the media and other secondary sources. We have captured them through 
longitudinal secondary data collection processes. The rationale for longitudi-
nal secondary data collection is that any tension with regard to sociopolitical 
legitimation continues for some time. However, some tensions are related 
to past incidents in which companies dissolved or left the market. Thus, it 
was not possible to interview all the actors who were involved in the pro-
cess of sentiment creation. In-depth interview of the key civil society actor 
who influenced sentiment creation was possible in only two cases, those of 
Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) and Asia Energy Limited.
Selection of the Research Context
South Asia, as one of the world’s oldest cultures and largest bases of human 
population, with an unprecedented 6% annual growth rate since 1990, is 
under-researched (Khilji, 2012). India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are the 
world’s second, sixth, and eighth most populous countries, respectively (as 
of July 2012, CIA Fact Book, 2012). The average working populations of 
these three countries comprise 61% of the population, with around 30% 
of the population below the age of 14, indicating an emerging working 
population throughout the entire region (CIA Fact Book, 2012). India is a 
Big Emerging Market (part of the BRIC country group), with considerably 
higher growth and a larger economy, while Pakistan and Bangladesh have 
been listed in the Next Eleven (N-11) emerging countries by Goldman and 
Sachs. JP Morgan named Bangladesh one of the “Frontier Five” markets for 
investment. All three countries share common historical and cultural roots, 
yet there are considerable variations among and within them that present a 
diverse and dynamic context for study.
Method Selection
As previously mentioned, we have chosen grounded theory method (GT) to 
theorize the typology of the sentiments based on nine cases. GT provides 
“systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative 
data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (Charmaz, 2006, 
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 Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 71
p. 2). These guidelines allow for the identification of patterns in data, and by 
analyzing patterns, researchers can derive empirically valid theory (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). GT is the best support to systematically examine and code 
the data for structuring of any phenomenon at a general level that leads to 
theory development. According to Orlikowski (1993), there are three main 
reasons GT fits our study: first, there is no previous theory on the typol-
ogy of sentiments as a cognitive institution that creates tension for TNC 
sociopolitical legitimation. Second, the study incorporates the complexities 
of organizational context into the understanding of the external sociopoliti-
cal phenomena; and third, GT is uniquely suited to studying the kinds of 
processes and changes that our study investigates (Urquhart & Fernandez, 
2006). We use the extant literature at the beginning of the study with the aim 
of effectively dealing with the important issues of bias and preconceptions 
(see Glaser, 2001; Sarker Lau, & Sahay, 2001) by understanding prior related 
studies, rather than being driven by the literature.
Case Selection and Reliability
The cases are based on sociopolitical tensions for TNCs in the selected 
countries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. There are nine case studies 
consisting of two types. The first type contains eight cases which are devel-
oped based on secondary data and information available from academic 
and nonacademic journals, Internet sources, interviews in newspapers and 
on YouTube, published cases, etc. The method is borrowed from the study 
by Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard (2011), who used it to develop cases 
on power struggles and organizational politics in TNCs. The rationale is 
that when tensions in sociopolitical legitimation of TNCs surface, they are 
documented by the media. It is often difficult to capture the relevant empiri-
cal information on the incidents that generate tension, as they are sensitive. 
When tensions calm down, they have already past, and the social actors 
concerned in sentiments and tensions are unreachable for interview.
The time frame in which incidents occurred is between 1990 and 2001 
(though some of the incidents persisted until 2007). The year 1990 is a criti-
cal year, as it is when these three countries began liberalizing their econo-
mies for foreign investment. The first author of this study started gathering 
information on the first eight cases in 2004 and continued until 2011. During 
this time frame information from multiple sources was collected, verified, 
and revised several times. Previous versions of the first eight cases were 
presented and published at three conferences, AGBA-World Congress (Rana, 
2007), AIB-SEA (Rana & Khilji, 2008), and ISMD (Rana, 2009). During the 
process of review and presentation of papers, scholars from the three coun-
tries at the conferences commented on and critiqued the cases. These com-
ments were addressed in the subsequent version. Rana, the first author on 
the case study presented at the AIB-SEA conference (Rana & Khilji, 2008), 
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72 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
is a Bangladeshi national and personally experienced some of the tensions 
described therein, while the second author, Khilji, is a Pakistani national. 
The purpose of the longitudinal secondary data collection was to under-
stand the nature of tensions and antecedents based on various expressions 
and interpretations that appeared in the public media that reflected multiple 
‘subjective views’ of the actors involved. This process helped us to draw the 
theoretical abstracts from the themes and information of the cases.
The second type of case, consisting of case C-9, was developed based 
on in-depth interviews, secondary documents, and observations. This case 
was a relatively recent event, making it possible to do interview with the civil 
society actor who was involved in creating the sentiment as a lead agent. 
The purpose of including this case is to corroborate the theoretical abstracts 
(seed concepts) derived from the first group of cases using this second type 
of case, which is developed based on both empirical and secondary infor-
mation. Having developed multiple cases over eight years (2004–2012), and 
added more cases until we reached the stage of data saturation, we meet the 
requirement of iterative conceptualization in the process of theory building. 
A list of the cases of both types is presented in Table 1.
The events described in the final case began in 2006 and continued until 
2010. The first author of this study lived in Bangladesh during the period of 
tension and personally observed the tension. He interviewed the key civil 
society actor, Professor Anu Mohammad, who led the movement and orga-
nized activist groups against the TNCs, during this period. Anu Mohammad is 
a professor of economics at Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, and the founder 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Information of the Cases
No. Case Year of Event
Country of 
Occurrence Form of Venture
Country of 
Origin of TNC
C-1 Lehar Pepsi 1990 India JV USA
C-2 Enron 1993–96 India WO consortium 
(Enron, GE, 
Bechtel)
USA
C-3 Stevedoring Services 
of America (SSA)
1997–2002 Bangladesh WO USA
C-4 Anti-American Senti-
ment & a Group 
of TNCs 
2004 Pakistan JV/Franchise N/A
C-5 Lever Brothers 1997–98 Bangladesh JV UK & The 
Netherlands
C-6 Mecca-Cola 2003 Pakistan WO France
C-7 McDonald’s India 2001 India JV USA
C-8 Hindustan Lever 2001–07 India JV UK & The 
Netherlands
C-9 Asia Energy Ltd. 2006–10 Bangladesh WO UK
JV = Joint Venture, WO = Wholly Owned.
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and secretary general of the National Committee for Protecting Oil, Gas, 
Port, and Natural Resources of Bangladesh, the activist group that protects 
the interests of the country and thus creates sentiment. This informal activist 
group counts among its members teachers, professionals, politicians, social 
workers, cultural activists, and students. It played a key role in creating ten-
sions in cases C-3 and C-9. Professor Mohammad was interviewed for an 
hour on June 18, 2012, for the purpose of getting a subjective interpretation 
of the sentiments that caused tension between TNCs and sociopolitical actors.
Research Process in Theory Building
The process of theory building, including the coding and analyzing data, 
is done in accordance with the guidelines of Urquhart, Lehman, and Myers 
(2010), presented in Figure 1.
SUMMARY OF THE CASES
A brief summary of the nine cases from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan is 
presented as follows. The cases mainly answer three questions: (1) What was 
the origin of the tension (adverse action) from the sociopolitical market? (2) 
Why did it come about (what antecedents are responsible)? (3) How was the 
tension aggravated or managed by the TNCs?
Case 1: Lehar Pepsi
PepsiCo entered the Indian market during the mid-1950s, but pulled out 
because it was not profitable enough. When PepsiCo left, an Indian company, 
FIGURE 1 Research process of theory building.
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74 M. B. Rana and O. J. Sørensen
Parle Exports, had become the dominant supplier of soft drinks under the 
brand name Thums Up. PepsiCo re-entered India in 1990 after three years of 
negotiations and public discourses. When PepsiCo began to negotiate with 
the Indian government to re-enter, a number of protectionist conditions were 
in place: only 40% foreign equity was allowed, foreign companies had to 
develop exports to compensate for import of equipment, strict conditions had 
to be met for repatriation of dividends, etc. During that time India’s attitude 
toward FDI (foreign direct investment) was summed up by the president of 
the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, who said, 
“Most of our people, in all political parties, have no concept of how the world 
is moving. My political friends think it’s the seventeenth century and that every 
investment … is going to come into India and take over.” Because of political 
sensitivity, the negotiation process with PepsiCo was lengthy and involved 
a number of public debates. The major argument of the public debates on 
PepsiCo’s re-entry was that foreign capital and imports should be restricted 
to those high technology areas in which India lacked expertise. However, 
it was further argued that the proposed production of processed foods and 
drinks was not essential, and that the imported equipment would hurt India’s 
balance of payments. Journalists, however, reported that PepsiCo had a CIA 
connection that aimed to undermine India’s independence. Although the ini-
tial investment was only $15 million, PepsiCo needed approval at the cabinet 
level. There were 20 parliamentary debates, 15 committee reviews, and 5,000 
articles in the press about the proposed investment over a three-year period.
PepsiCo negotiated a joint venture ( JV) arrangement with two Indian 
companies that it felt it could ease the negotiation process. However, the 
joint venture required government approval to function. One of the two 
Indian companies in the JV was a division of Tata Industries, which is India’s 
most reputable and dominant company. The second one was a government-
owned company, Punjab Agro Industries. The idea was to signal that the 
public interest would be served by the venture.
As part of its strategy, PepsiCo and its JV partners proposed that the 
new company locate in the politically volatile state of Punjab, where they 
enlisted the support of Sikh (a religious group) leaders who lobbied publicly 
on their behalf. They claimed that providing jobs would help Punjabi farm-
ers and subdue Sikh terrorism. The partners estimated that the investment 
would create 25,000 jobs in Punjab and another 25,000 elsewhere; these 
numbers were announced in the media. They also pointed out that China 
and the former Soviet Union had allowed entry of foreign soft drink produc-
ers, showing how India was lagging behind other socialist countries. They 
further argued that new technology and know-how would prevent some of 
the waste of fruits grown in Punjab that would be used by the company, 
which they estimated at 30%.
The U.S. government, without public reference to PepsiCo, threatened 
to impose trade sanctions against India because of its strict foreign investment 
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regulation. Indian government officials and the management of the JV secretly 
met. Subsequently, PepsiCo agreed to place a new logo, Lehar (meaning 
“tide” in Hindi), above the Pepsi insignia, in order to better align itself with 
public debates and sentiment. The JV management also lobbied publicly 
against U.S. trade sanctions against India. The U.S. government backed down. 
India’s Ministry of Food Processing Industries announced tax breaks for food 
processors in India, and PepsiCo re-entered the Indian market (A Passage to 
India, 1989; Chakravarty, 1989; Kaye, 1988; Spaeth, 1989; Weisman, 1988).
Case 2: Enron India
In just 15 years Enron Corp. grew to be America’s seventh largest company. It 
was accused of corruption, bribery, and exploitation of the Indian economy. 
Subsequently, it was forced to leave the country due to huge protests and 
growing sociopolitical pressure.
In 1993 Enron came to India, forming a consortium with GE and Bechtel 
to build a massive, 2,015- megawatt power plant costing US$20 billion with 
a 20-year power-purchase contract with the Maharashtra State Electricity 
Board. When the story of the secret contract was broken by Zee TV, it 
became public that Enron would use natural liquefied gas from one of its 
subsidiaries in the Middle East. Many social actors and scholars considered 
this odd because India had abundant coal, traditionally a much cheaper and 
more commonly used fuel for generating electricity. The proposed project 
would have increased the cost of electricity production and thus the cost 
to the Maharashtra Electricity Board. Public sentiment turned against Enron 
when this information appeared in newspapers and on television.
In an interview, Raghu Dhar of Zee TV told CBS News correspondent 
Bob Simon about how Enron, with the help of two U.S. administrations, 
pushed for and built the plant. Though it would quadruple Indian electric-
ity bills, it guaranteed large profits at no risk to Enron. Zee TV criticized the 
move, pointing out that the deal signed with Enron would be burdensome 
to the Indian people, who would have to pay for all the power produced, 
whether or not it was needed or used by the Maharashtra Board.
The World Bank refused to invest in the project and issued a report 
warning that the plant and the electricity were much too expensive, but the 
U.S. government backed Enron’s plan. Subsequently news outlets reported 
that in an effort to stop his criticism of its proposed operations in India, 
Enron had offered the business editor of India’s largest television network 
US$1 million a year to be its corporate communications chief. According to 
Pradyumna Kaul, a management consultant evaluating the Enron project for 
the Indian government, “The Indian government in Delhi was told that they 
would have no alternative but to sign [Enron’s deal]. That was the only con-
dition from the U.S. government to continue to support India on the foreign 
exchange financial front.”
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Despite negative sentiments and public debates the project went 
through, but ultimately the plant was shut down as India’s state electric 
company could no longer pay Enron’s bills. Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay 
demanded a billion-dollar bailout from the Indian central government, which 
was backed by the American administration. A local politician, the media, 
and civil society members played key roles in stopping the Enron project. 
The politician even made it a campaign promise. Media reports fuelled the 
growing tension that India’s national interest was undermined and threat-
ened. Later, it was made public that the Indian government was forced to 
sign the deal. Enron Corp. finally went bankrupt in 2001 due to poor corpo-
rate governance practices. (Enron Scandal at a Glance, 2002; Kohn, 2009).
Case 3: Stevedoring Services of America (SSA)
In 1997 Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) bought 200 acres of coastal 
land in Chittagong, Bangladesh, to construct an international container ter-
minal costing US$550 million.
The Chittagong Port Authority planned to scrap a 20-year-old agree-
ment with the labor union that would have allowed SSA to hire workers 
only from registered trade unions. This was the result of the agreement 
between SSA and the Port Authority. The idea was to avoid the irregulari-
ties and partisan politicization of the labor unions that often caused violent 
conflicts and strikes. The Port Authority believed that the proposed terminal 
would be more efficient if SSA had more freedom in hiring workers (Rana, 
2009). Labor union leaders opposed this decision. Mohiuddin Ahmed, then 
mayor of Chittagong Metropolitan City and opposition Awami League leader, 
sparked the public outcry and the sentiment and organized the movement 
against the SSA’s investment. As a former dock labor leader, Mohiuddin had 
a strong influence over the trade unions at Chittagong port. The movement 
he led comprised both political and labor activism against the government’s 
decision and SSA’s investment.
“He called upon the people to resist the construction of the container 
terminal port and termed it a conspiracy of America to control the ship-
ping route” (Samad, 2002). Opposition political leaders and intellectuals 
publicly argued that the proposed container terminal would have modern 
logistical facilities and would thus eventually cause the government port, 
which did not have automated logistical supports, to lose its annual earn-
ings. This would result in layoffs at the government port due to its lower 
number of service operations. The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, 
Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, led by Professor Anu Mohammad, 
joined the movement based on the argument that the nation’s foreign trade 
would be dependent on a U.S.-owned port. Concern for layoffs, national 
security, and nationalism became the central reasons for the mass move-
ment against SSA.
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While trade workers demanded that SSA recruit from registered trade 
unions, this posed a high risk for SSA, as it would be difficult to ensure 
higher efficiency if they had limited choices for recruitment as was the case 
at the government port. Dockworkers vowed to continue the strike, which 
was supported by 30.000 port workers, opposition leaders, and civil society 
members (BBC News, May 29, 2002).
In 2002, after 33 days of strike and a number of violent clashes between 
police and dockworkers, the High Court of Bangladesh ruled that the gov-
ernment’s approval of the construction of the private container terminal was 
illegal, resulting in the suspension of SSA’s construction work. Bangladesh’s 
Supreme Court found that the government’s deal with SSA bypassed the 
jurisdiction of the Port Authority. Supreme Court had termed the granted 
lease of the land by the Port Authority “an arbitrary manner” (Price, 2004).
Case 4: Anti-American Sentiment and the Responses 
of a Group of TNCs 
During the United States’ attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 
2003, brochures and pamphlets were distributed in some public places in 
Pakistan such as mosques, parks, schools, universities, roadsides, and mar-
kets. The brochures contained information distinguishing between “local and 
foreign products,” and on the “same level quality.” This was an attempt to 
exploit anti-American sentiment among Pakistanis during the war period. 
Local Pakistani companies started using the slogan “Be Pakistani, Buy 
Pakistani.” This campaign eventually damaged the market shares and images 
of many global brands like Nestlé’s Polo, Lifebuoy of Unilever, McDonald’s, 
Igloo, and KFC. Most of these TNCs had either joint venture or local fran-
chise operations in Pakistan. Amazingly, the information that had this pal-
pable effect was distributed through informal channels and word of mouth 
and was based “merely” on emotional appeal, making no claims as to real 
benefits on the basis of quality.
During this time it was difficult for a few TNCs that marketed American 
brands or were perceived to be U.S.-branded to manage and sustain brand 
image. Local competitors emerged aggressively and tried to capture market 
share while the market showed strong anti-American sentiment. This anti-
American sentiment was caused by the perception that the U.S. invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq were acts of anti-Islamic aggression. Anti-American 
sentiment paved the way for local companies to convert consumers to the 
motto “Be Pakistani, Buy Pakistani.” This was a media strategy of the local 
companies that sparked the nationalistic sentiment of the general public.
While local companies opted for a patriotic approach by picking up 
the word “Pakistani,” TNCs sought a different path. Some of them preferred 
to keep a low profile and stopped media advertising, while others changed 
their overall communication strategies. After a while, most of the TNCs 
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mimicked the local companies’ successful strategy and incorporated the 
theme “Pakistani” into their product marketing and promotional campaigns. 
KFC was the best example of this practice, followed by others including 
Nestlé’s Polo, Lifebuoy, and McDonald’s. Along with the Pakistani theme in 
their promotional campaigns, Igloo and KFC showed how much they con-
tributed to the socioeconomic development of Pakistan. At the same time, 
they used the national flag and the green color of the flag on the packaging 
of their products to exploit patriotic feeling. Rafiq Rangoonwala, CEO at 
KFC Pakistan (it is owned by the Cupola Group, a high-profile UAE-based 
conglomerate) explained, “The objective was to clearly establish the truth 
about multinationals and their contribution in Pakistan. We wanted to por-
tray the bigger picture and not fold to the slanted propaganda of certain 
vested interests.” Obviously, locals had a different point of view. According 
to Hatim Fakhruddin, brand manager at Igloo, “The planned objective was 
to counter the competition and strategically brand Igloo as the only national 
ice cream company in Pakistan.” Muhammad Amjad, group brand manager 
at Young’s Food Products, added, “Our objective is to identify the corporate 
brand Young’s and its sub-brands as Pakistani with pride and contributory 
to the country.”
An interesting element of this communication strategy was to use the 
national flag emblazoned everywhere. Fakhruddin commented, “We used 
the national flag because this is the sign of our unity and it symbolizes our 
true expression of love and belonging to our homeland. The main advantage 
Igloo anticipated from it was to identify it with the country and its people 
and their emotions regarding their homeland.” These companies not only 
managed to halt the short-term sales decline due to anti-American senti-
ment, but were able to ensure trust and respect for the brand. Regarding the 
success of these communication strategies, Rangoonwala said, “The market 
feedback was astounding when people realized the implications of their 
actions against TNCs’ positions. We believe we had significantly accom-
plished what we had set out to achieve.” Aly Mustansir, marketing manager 
of Lifebuoy, was also happy: “We are pleased to see that our efforts were 
met with genuine appreciation that exceeded our expectations.” Although 
KFC, Igloo, Unilever, and YFP obtained the desired results from this strategy, 
this was not the case with every brand that tried to jump on the Pakistani-
branding bandwagon (Ahsan, 2004; Ralph, 2012).
Case 5: Lever Brothers Bangladesh
Lever Brothers Bangladesh, presently Unilever, has been operating in 
Bangladesh since 1964. It is the market leader in detergent and toiletries and 
has a strong foothold in the sociopolitical market due to its long presence.
In 1997, a local company called Aromatic Cosmetics Limited tarnished 
the Lever Brothers brand image and corporate reputation by claiming in an 
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aggressive promotional campaign that most detergent and toiletries compa-
nies, including Lever Brothers, used imported animal fat in making soap (toi-
let and laundry soap) that was primarily sourced from pig fat. This campaign 
created a feeling in the society that Level Brothers had betrayed the trust of 
the Muslim majority in Bangladesh, as the soap was not “Halal.” Halal is a 
religious concept in Islam that draws a clear demarcation between permis-
sible and non-permissible substances and actions for Muslims.
Aromatic claimed that it used vegetable fat in producing “Halal soap” instead 
of animal fat. Because pig is taboo for Muslims, consumers almost stopped 
buying Lever’s soap LUX. The message conveyed by the public’s response to 
Aromatic’s campaign was that the company had violated the religious faith and 
values of the people because it knew that pig is taboo for Muslims.
Sales of Aromatic soap rose abruptly and it became the leading brand 
on the market within a few months, while sales of the LUX brand dropped 
sharply. People began to regard Lever as a foreign company that had betrayed 
their trust and violated tenets of their faith for a long time.
For some time, Lever strategically went into hibernation and almost 
stopped advertising. After some time, it launched a new promotional cam-
paign with a new product and packaging, which claimed that it also used 
“vegetable fat.” Despite strategic repositioning it could not regain consumer 
confidence and trust so quickly. Long-term marketing strategies, public rela-
tions, and new promotional policies helped it regain its lost market share 
after a couple of years.
Case 6: Mecca-Cola
“No more drinking stupid, drink with commitment!” With this slogan Mecca-
Cola, a French-owned company, started its soft drink business with an aim 
to cash in on anti-American sentiment and Muslim religious beliefs. In its 
corporate policy it announced that it would donate 20% of its net profit to 
charities; 10% would go to Palestinian charities for child welfare and skills 
training. The remaining 10% would be given to European associations that 
work toward world peace and support the Palestinian people in their legiti-
mate struggle for independence (Mecca-Cola website, 2004).
French Tunisian entrepreneur Tawfik Mathlouthi launched the contro-
versial cola brand in 2002, mainly in Europe and the Middle East, as well as 
in Asia, as a rival to Coca-Cola. News outlets had reported that Coca-Cola 
had acknowledged that it felt the impact of boycotts of its brand in the 
Middle East at that time. Ben Deutsche, spokesman for Coca-Cola, said, “Our 
business and local bottling partners in the Middle East have felt the impact 
from the boycott.” Rita Clifton, chairwoman of London-based InterBrand, a 
global branding consultancy firm, said Mecca-Cola stands out as a compet-
ing product against a dominant global brand because it represents the first 
viable alternative based on a political and cultural identity. “Usually, when 
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there have been calls for boycotts of American brands, there were no substi-
tutes that people could opt for instead. Mecca-Cola represents that alterna-
tive,” said Clifton (Bhatnagar, 2003; Murphy, 2003).
Mecca-Cola entered Pakistan in 2003 and received a huge response 
from the day it entered. It challenged the U.S. giants Coca-Cola and Pepsi’s 
market dominance in Pakistan at a time when there was fierce anti-American 
sentiment and people were looking for a substitute (Henley & Vasagar, 2003).
Referring to sales of the product, Mathlouthi reported that some 750 bil-
lion bottles had been sold in 54 countries in 2003. After launching the prod-
uct in Pakistan during the holy month of Ramadan, the founder announced 
that new factories would be set up in various cities in Pakistan, including 
Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. Thus Mecca-Cola showed its commitment 
to the Pakistani people and society, proving that its new investments would 
create jobs for locals (Mecca-Cola launched in Pakistan, 2003).
Case 7: McDonald’s India
McDonald’s entered India in 1996 and became a joint venture (50:50) with 
around 50 outlets by 2003. In April 2001, the fast food chain faced a debacle 
after it revealed that its U.S. French fries contained natural beef extract. 
As soon as this information became public, Hindus and vegetarians world-
wide reacted furiously. They felt misled and cheated even though the com-
pany had never explicitly claimed that its fries were suitable for vegetarians. 
However, it had always complied with the requirements of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). (Note: Cows are sacred to Hindus, thus they do 
not eat them. Vegetarians in India have ideological and religious reasons for 
being vegetarian, not health reasons only.)
H. B. Barti, a Hindu lawyer from Seattle, took the initiative to file a 
lawsuit against McDonald’s. The Vegetarian Legal Action Network (VLAN) 
also made its voice heard. The mission of VLAN is to protect the rights of 
vegetarians. The reaction in India to the revelation was swift.
Soon after the information became public, religious groups in India took 
the issue to the public to foster an outcry. A group of agitated people ransacked 
several franchises in India and called for a boycott of McDonald’s for violating 
their religious and ideological identities and values. Hindu political groups such 
as Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Internet action group 
McSpotlight Network also voiced their views. These pressure groups called for 
an investigation, a public apology, and sued for damages from the company.
McDonald’s India allowed a public investigation and publicly apolo-
gized. In the United States, McDonald’s also publicly apologized for wrong-
doing. The investigation in India did not find beef extract in the French fries 
on the vegetable menu. McDonald’s Inc. also paid a US$10 million compen-
sation package for the welfare of vegetarian and religious groups in India 
(Zwart & Tulder, 2006).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
alb
or
g U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
], 
[M
oh
am
ma
d R
an
a] 
at 
09
:46
 21
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
14
 
 Legitimation of TNCs in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan 81
Today India is the only country in the world where McDonald’s does 
not offer any beef or pork on the menu. McDonald’s India took several stra-
tegic actions to neutralize the negative sentiments of the public; for instance, 
it used slogans and statements in advertisement asserting, “We do not use 
any animal flavoring or extract for any of our vegetable products, including 
French fries. All our vegetarian products are 100% vegetarian” (“McDonald’s 
outlets in India do not use beef or pork,” 2004). Indian McDonald’s outlets 
also began to offer new vegetarian menu items with local names such as the 
“Shudh Shakahari Burger” (100% vegetable burger). McDonald’s India pub-
licly announced that it had created its own supply chain in India, resulting 
in more job creation and the growth of small businesses in India, during the 
time of the conflict.
Case 8: Hindustan Lever
Hindustan Lever (HLL), Unilever’s subsidiary in India, had a strong foothold 
in the market and society. It had long experience of the business system and 
local culture of India spanning more than half a century.
Despite extensive collaborations with local NGOs for CSR and other 
activities, it was accused of environmental damage and unsafe work con-
ditions by ex-workers associations and civil society groups such as Palni 
Hills Conservation Council (PHCC), Tamil Nadu Alliance Against Mercury 
(TAAM), and Greenpeace. The allegations included charges of damaging the 
environmental balance with mercury radiation at its thermometer factory in 
Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu.
A number of workers and their families are thought to be victims of the 
persistent dangers caused by the mercury radiation. In 2001, Greenpeace 
called for “Prosecuting HLL for Forest Crimes” caused by HLL’s inadequate 
commitment to integrity and concern for public health and the environment. 
This incident put HLL’s credibility in question in the greater society.
Ameer Shahul, Toxics Campaigner, Greenpeace India, said, “In any 
developed country, Unilever would have been forced to clean up and 
remediation of such a disaster site immediately, using best standards and 
practices. There is ample evidence to prove that the mercury emitted from 
the HLL plant had far greater and wider impacts than the experts commis-
sioned by HLL were prepared to reveal. And yet, three years after being 
caught, HLL has yet to submit complete clean-up protocols to the Pollution 
Control Board. Thousands of people, especially workers, their families, and 
other residents, have been unsuspecting victims of the persistent dangers 
posed by Unilever’s inadequate commitment to transparency, integrity, or 
concern for public health and environment” (“Prosecute HLL for Forest 
Crimes,” 2004).
Soon after the news broke and public outcry began growing, HLL closed 
down the factory and investigated the matter with its own research team, for 
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which it engaged the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute 
of India (NEERI) and an independent international research organization. 
At the same time, it also allowed various national government agencies to 
investigate the allegations and suspected radiation affecting workers and the 
environment.
Finally, after six years of waiting, in 2007 the Madras High Court directed 
the government to investigate the matter by expert committee. The expert 
committee did not find any clinical conditions at that time among the factory 
workers tied to mercury exposure at the factory in the past.
Case 9: Asia Energy Ltd
Asia Energy Pty Ltd, a UK-based mining company, entered Bangladesh in 
2005 to extract coal at Phulbari, Dinajpur. Its aim was to construct a power 
plant of 500-MW, a US$1.4 billion project with an estimated land requirement 
for the coal mine area of 6,000 hectares or 60 square kilometers. The area 
contains more than 100 villages (around 150,000 inhabitants) in the Dinajpur 
district. Thousands of acres of croplands as well as houses, schools, colleges, 
roads, railroads, markets, and business centers fall within the project area.
The company claimed that Bangladesh would receive returns worth 
US$21 billion over the 30 years of the mine’s lifetime. Of this, US$7.8 billion 
would come as direct financial gains and US$13.7 billion as indirect multi-
plier benefits. The profits would include 6% royalty, 45% corporate tax (tax 
on earned profit), and 2.5% import duty.
As it used the open-pit method to extract coal, the project severely 
affected the livelihoods of the inhabitants and the climate of the area. It was 
estimated that 129,417 people would be displaced while 80% of the land in 
the area would be made unproductive for agricultural use. Local inhabit-
ants and civil society members claimed that when the extraction started, 
cultivated land outside the mine was contaminated by the coal during the 
rainy season and floods, which damaged the crops. During extraction mine 
operation required that water be sucked out around the clock, which dried 
up the surrounding land. The water table fell so far during the dry sea-
son that local residents could not get drinking water from their tube wells. 
Although Asia Energy conformed to the regulations of the government and 
began operations as per the conditions of its agreement with the govern-
ment, local people opposed the open-cut method and the evacuation of 
their lands, on which they had lived for generations. A national commit-
tee composed of civil society members called the National Committee to 
Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports, led by Professor Anu 
Mohammad, started organizing actions against Asia Energy. The movement 
created huge public outcry through writing, speaking, public discussions, 
and actions such as strikes and blocking of operations. It is notable that a 
national committee with no formal structure has become a trusted patriotic 
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activist group in Bangladesh that receives public support and participation 
from people from all facets of society regardless of political identity, religious 
belief, or occupation. During the course of the movement’s public actions 
local political leaders from both the ruling and opposition parties and from 
farmers’ groups joined, although officially the ruling political party did not 
support the movement at any stage.
The national committee was successful in creating sentiment against 
Asia Energy on the ground, raising awareness that it damaged the climate 
and cultivable lands, affected the local people’s lives by appropriating their 
forefather’s lands, and offered many more losses than benefits in terms of 
financial returns, livelihoods, environment, and social identity of the people 
in the mine area. Kalafut and Moody (2008), in their casebook on Asia Energy, 
reflected the society’s view in six points that affected the public discourse:
• People and the activist groups demanded for no open-pit mine, compatible 
use of coal, and eco-friendly methods.
• The project underestimated the number of affected people and civil society’s 
sentiments.
• There was no replacement plan for agricultural land occupied.
• The company had an inadequate compensation package and limited reha-
bilitation measures.
• There was a lack of transparency and collaborative attitude on the firm’s side.
• National interests and ownership were undermined.
On August 26, 2006, around 50,000 farmers, members of surrounding 
ethnic communities, students, local political leaders, and civil society mem-
bers marched toward Asia Energy’s headquarters office to halt its operations. 
While the protesters marched toward the plant, paramilitary forces started 
firing on them. Eight people died, and more than 50 were wounded. The 
protests continued until the government agreed to accept the demands of 
the people and an official agreement was signed between protesters led by 
the national committee and the government. All news media outlets gave the 
protests large coverage by continuously reporting on the story. In a newspa-
per interview, the secretary general of the national committee, Professor Anu 
Mohammad, said, “It is Bangladesh where the coal was found, and a foreign 
company will become its owner? There is no proper way to measure the 
actual benefit to Bangladesh and the price it would pay. What becomes clear 
is that Bangladesh will have to buy its own coal from the company at an 
international price.” Protests continued in an infrequent manner until 2010, 
when Asia Energy tried to resume operations using the open-pit method 
(Pulbariresistance.blogspot.com, 2009).
In a newspaper interview, Anu Mohammad continued:
[It is] not only the socio-economic benefit for the country that our organ-
isation demands from the TNCs in the extraction, energy, and oil sectors; 
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we also care about the environmental protection of our nation. We want to 
ensure our ownership, i.e., “people’s ownership,” of the natural resources 
such as gas, oil, coal, and the ports. And we don’t want TNCs to export our 
natural resources since we badly need them for our economic development. 
You have witnessed that we forced the government not to allow Tata’s US$2 
billion investments in the coal-based power plant. We also forced the gov-
ernment to stop exporting gas by ConocoPhillips, and put pressure on gov-
ernment to stop a coal-based power plant in the mangrove forest in Khulna. 
However, we are not against the FDI in general.
ANALYSIS
Theoretical coding from the nine cases provides us with a pattern that 
shows five types of sentiments that cause tension in sociopolitical legitima-
tion of TNCs (see appendix). These sentiments are underpinned by similar 
types of antecedents rooted in the society’s cognitive framework. The five 
types of sentiment are: religiosity, ideology, ecology, nationalism, and patrio-
tism. The reason antecedents are rooted in society’s cognitive framework is 
that these antecedents lie in society’s value system, history, culture, identity, 
emotions, and judgments; thus they affect individuals’ thinking and decision-
making processes and often lead to group behavior and group perception. 
Media, religious and political groups, NGOs, and civil society members help 
instigate these sentiments when TNCs, by their actions, undermine society’s 
cognitive institutional standards.
FIGURE 2 Typology of the sentiments that cause tension in the process of sociopolitical 
legitimation of TNCs.
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The five types of sentiments that cause tensions for TNCs’ sociopolitical 
legitimation are grouped into three major types: (1) religiosity and ideology; 
(2) nationalism and patriotism;, and (3) ecological balance (see Figure 2 and 
appendix). They are conceptualized in the following text. Lessons from the 
failed attempts and success stories in the cases are taken into consideration 
for conceptualizing the three different sentiments.
TYPOLOGY OF THE “SENTIMENTS”
In this section the seed concepts in the typology of “sentiment” derived from 
the cases are scaled up and further conceptualized. As already mentioned, 
sentiments extracted from the case studies are grouped into three types: 
religiosity and ideology; nationalism and patriotism; and ecological balance 
(Table 2, Table 3, and Appendix). Different disciplines use typologies in 
a variety of ways with different meanings, indicating different conceptu-
alizations. Here we shall conceptualize them as to how different types of 
sentiments affect TNC internationalization and international management, 
leading them to earn different degrees of sociopolitical legitimation in the 
three countries. Figure 2 depicts the three types of sentiments that emerge 
from cognitive institutions and cause tension in the process of sociopolitical 
legitimation of TNCs in the host South Asian context.
Sentiment for Religiosity and Ideology
According to Stark and Bainbridge (1985) religion is the set of beliefs, activi-
ties, and institutions based on faith in supernatural forces. We consider reli-
giosity as a broad spectrum in which beliefs, values, teachings, and scripts 
are included. This dimension affects regulative, normative, and cognitive 
institutional features, depending on the degree to which religiosity is mani-
fested in a particular society.
In contrast, ideology is defined differently from different standpoints. 
Examples of the philosophical standpoint include Hegelian, Marxist, and 
Confucian worldviews. From a psychological standpoint, ideology is seen 
as ethnocentrism or the ideology of individualism and attitude formation 
(Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008; Duckitt, Wagner, Plessis, & Birum, 2002; 
Krauss, 2006, 2002). From the political science viewpoint, the political system—
i.e., communism, social welfare, or capitalism—can be an ideology. Ideology 
has always been at the center of the discourse of political science (Brzezinski, 
1960; Crockett & Wallendorf, 2004). Whatever the standpoint for the defini-
tion of ideology is, it is a cognitive psychology (Sampson, 1981) and is often 
intertwined with religiosity and national identity, depending on the context.
Based on the political viewpoint, Dawson (2001, pp. 4–5) defines ideol-
ogy as “a worldview readily found in the population, including sets of ideas 
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and values that cohere, that are used publicly to justify political stances, 
and that shape and are shaped by society. Further, political ideology helps 
to define who are one’s friends and enemies, with whom one would form 
political coalitions, and furthermore, contains a casual narrative of society 
and the state. Cognitively, ideology refers to what one ‘sees’ and responds to 
in the social world.” In contrast, den Hond and de Bakker (2007) define ide-
ology from the sociological standpoint: “The concept of ideology comprises 
an interconnected set of beliefs and attitudes relating to problematic aspects 
of social and political topics that are shared and used by members of a group 
and that inform and justify choice and behavior” (p. 903).
As far as the context of our study is concerned, the political systems 
of the three countries are dominated by religious identities and ideologies, 
although India and, recently, Bangladesh have secular constitutional frame-
works. The political ideologies of the parties in South Asian countries are 
divided on the basis of either religious faith vs. secularism or pro-communism 
vs. pro-capitalism viewpoints. Political relations with foreign countries, includ-
ing neighboring countries, are shaped by the ideological viewpoints of the 
political parties that run the government. This phenomenon directly affects 
intra/inter-regional trade and investment, so the degree of internationaliza-
tion is influenced. For instance, because of anti-Indian sentiment, Tata’s US$3 
billion investment proposal was stalled in Bangladesh during the regime of 
the pro-Islamic BNP-led government from 2000 to 2005 (BBC News, 2006). 
By contrast, airtel India was allowed easy entry into the Bangladeshi telecom-
munications market in 2010 when the Awami League-led government came 
to power; the Awami League is said to have strong ideological (i.e., secular-
ist) alignment with India’s ruling Congress party. Religion has a strong influ-
ence over the legal and education systems of these three countries, and thus 
religion completely underpins the cognitive institutions of the people, which 
tend to affect the sentiments, causing tension in sociopolitical legitimacy.
In international marketing, the selection of products by consumers tends 
to be conditioned by the extent to which religiosity and ideological sentiments 
underpin the cognitive mind-set of the people. We can see this phenomenon 
in vegetarianism, the Halal concept, ethnocentrism, and the country-of-origin 
effect (COO). Amine (2008) finds that there is a correlation between the 
country-of-origin effect and animosity expressed in Francophobia and anti-
Americanism, which may be caused by religiosity, hostility between countries, 
economic nationalism, or the ideological mind-set of the people. However, 
sentiments may on the one hand pose challenges to TNCs in the sociopo-
litical market, but on the other hand may turn into opportunities as long as 
TNCs can strategically cash in on them. This phenomenon can be seen in 
the cases of Mecca-Cola and Lehar Pepsi. Moreover, Hollensen (2007) once 
argued that the effect of the cartoon of the prophet Muhammad published in 
a Danish newspaper ( January-February 2006) was the effect on business of 
Danish TNCs and the Danish image in the Muslim world.
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One facet of the religious and ideological sentiment is the boycott 
movement by activist groups and consumers. They call for boycotts of 
products from a particular country or a particular company (Friedman, 
1991; Munro, 2005). The reasons boycotts take place include child labor, 
animal rights, human rights, fair prices, workplace safety requirements, 
illegal occupation of the country, etc. Examples include movements to 
boycott Israel and Israeli products (http://boycottisraeltoday.wordpress.
com, http://www.bigcampaign.org) and the Ethical Consumers movement 
(http://www.ethicalconsumer.org), in which some TNCs are explicitly 
targeted.
Another facet is the religious-value-based business that targets a specific 
segment of consumers that professes that value. For example, Islamic bank-
ing (Shariah Banking), Islamic insurance (Takaful), and Islamic management 
are increasingly popular in the Muslim world. Islamic banking and finance is 
a popular model in many places with predominantly Muslim populations or 
large Muslim diaspora communities. There are several transnational banks, 
such as Citigroup, Société Générale, HSBC, and Lloyds TSB that also offer 
Islamic financial products and services around the world (Hearn, Piesse, & 
Strange, 2012).
In management and organization, Parboteeah, Paik, and Cullen (2009) 
find that Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity have a great influ-
ence on work values and human resource management. Cash, Gray, and 
Rood (2000) showed how religion and spirituality affect work practices 
and values—through holidays, rituals, leaves of absence, dress codes, sym-
bols, relationships, etc. Another study by Hill (2007) reveals that East Asian 
management styles have been highly influenced and shaped by different 
religions and ideologies such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Confucianism, Taoism, Sikhism, etc. Such identities and cognitive affiliations 
with religion and ideology shape one’s mental and behavioral actions that 
significantly impact TNCs operations and management.
The ideological viewpoint of the society, which tends to be under-
pinned by the regulative and cognitive institutions, is also important to 
TNCs in the case of international business. TNCs can, however, cash in on 
such sentiments through strategic actions; this may apply to religious senti-
ments, as well. For instance, Telenor has been offering a free call service and 
Internet protection with regard to child abuse and sexual harassment, which 
they consider as part of their CSR activities in Scandinavia. However, it does 
not use this strategy in its largest market in South Asia due to the different 
ideological viewpoint of the society.
The conceptualization of the religious and ideological sentiment there-
fore emphasises that TNCs must attempt to understand such sentiments in 
the society and address them in their corporate strategies and structures 
depending on the context, in which the type and degree of the sentiment 
vary.
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Ecological Sentiment
Today, env ironmental issues and climate change have become central issues 
in science, business, and politics, and are getting increasing attention in 
the public discourse. Although not included in the dominant cultural value 
dimensions, one recent study by Vliert, Einarsen, Euwema, and Janssen 
(2009) argues that unique local cultural values are shaped by climate-based 
demands and wealth-based resources, and vice-versa. This limits the univer-
sally endorsed cultural values and practices that underpin common decisions 
and actions of recruitment, handling of work motives, conforming to leader-
ship ideals, and shaping organizational structures and strategies around the 
world.
In this article we define this concept as “ecological” on a broad spec-
trum. According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000), “eco-
logical” is defined as “relating to or concerned with the relation of living 
organisms to one another and to their physical surroundings.” We therefore 
aim to conceptualize ecological sentiment according to the previous defini-
tion. Since sociopolitical legitimation of TNCs has two markets in the host 
context, consumers and sociopolitical actors, we will use examples from 
the research findings to illuminate these two markets and the ecological 
sentiment.
Marketing in local and international contexts has adopted the ecological 
viewpoint from the perspective of consumerism to a considerable degree. 
Chamorro and Banegil (2006) assert that ecological awareness should be 
treated as one of the values that will determine the organizational culture, 
and thus the marketer needs to understand “green marketing” not solely as 
an activity but also as a philosophy. Using the theory of reasoned action, 
Polonsky, Vocino, Grau, Garma, and Ferdous (2012) find a positive rela-
tionship among general and carbon-specific knowledge, attitude toward 
the environment, and general and carbon-specific behavior of consumers. 
Studies indicate that there is a segment of consumers characterized by having 
an ecologically aware lifestyle, that is, environmental consciousness, select-
ing and recycling products, and taking part in events to protect the environ-
ment (Fraj & Martinez, 2006). Thus, these consumers’ purchasing behavior is 
conditioned by their environmental attitudes and sentiments (Singh, Vrontis, & 
Thrassou, 2011). It is not the case that a TNC can only have a broader cus-
tomer base if it focuses on ecological issues; transparency and willingness 
to engage in pro-environmental behavior can also affect consumers’ percep-
tions of the company (Vaccaro & Echeverri, 2010).
Many TNCs address these issues by incorporating ecological values into 
their business philosophies and thus express them through their corporate 
strategies and social responsibilities. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is a good exam-
ple. GSK has signed an agreement with the UN’s Global Compact initiative 
and adopted strategies along the global value chain and in CSR activities that 
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focus both on ecological balance and on local development in the health and 
livelihood of people in emerging countries (including the study countries, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India). It is not true that TNCs should only focus 
on earning consumers’ positive perceptions and the approval of the host/
home regulative institutions; they should also intend to ensure legitimacy 
among multilateral institutions. Teng (2011) finds that achieving ISO14001 
certification as part of an environmental strategy has a positive and signifi-
cant impact on corporate values, as an effect of internal asset.
There are two main objectives for this strategic approach. One is for 
the TNC to position itself differently in the eyes of consumers (marketing 
point of view). The second is to legitimize itself in the eyes of sociopolitical 
actors by being responsible and sensitive to ecology. TNCs can do this by 
enhancing organizational absorptive capacity on environment-related knowl-
edge in specific contexts (Pinkse, Kuss, & Hoffmann, 2010). Therefore, they 
can incorporate a reactive sense of environmental responsiveness by inducing 
an internal change process and leadership within the organization (Dahlmann 
& Brammer, 2011).
The degree of ecological sentiment often surpasses the extent of religi-
osity and ideological sentiment, and it depends on the extent to which civil 
society actors and regulative institutions play roles in the process of develop-
ing discourses and sentiments in a certain society.
Jacques (2006) argues that “environmental skepticism” is growing day 
by day. As a result, TNCs should be careful in their treatment of this issue. 
His study further indicates several references that this skepticism phenom-
enon has been very much cognitive, and even though almost everything 
in modernity demonstrates human improvement, people (consumers and 
social actors) will continue to believe they are getting worse (Simon, 1999). 
Thus, the public views TNCs’ behavior suspiciously and often protests when 
it perceives TNCs as untrustworthy and irresponsible. Ecological sentiment 
therefore is a dominant antecedent of cognitive institutions that has dynamic 
influence not only over marketing and consumer behavior, but also on socio-
political legitimization.
Sentiment of Nationalism and Patriotism
Nationalism and patriotism have many facets that affect TNCs’ sociopolitical 
legitimacy. This group of sentiments can be defined as “national spirit or 
aspirations, devotion and loyalty to one’s own nation, patriotism or exces-
sive patriotism, chauvinism, the desire for national advancement or indepen-
dence, the policy or doctrine of asserting the interests of one’s own nation, 
viewed as separate from the interests of other nations (identity) or the com-
mon interests of all nations” (http://dictionary.reference.com). The Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000) defines nationalism as “an extreme 
form of patriotism marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries.”
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The concept of nationalism and national interest has been widely stud-
ied in sociology, political science, and history. However, it is poorly addressed 
in international business studies. The sentiment for nationalism and national 
interest is often intertwined with religiosity and ideology as well as ecologi-
cal sentiment; it is hard to separate them from each other, particularly when 
they are manifested as sentiments against TNCs’ behavior.
In business this concept has long been used in two dimensions. One 
is the consumers’ dimension, which encompasses patriotism and consumer 
ethnocentrism (Rybina, Reardon, & Humphrey, 2010), country of origin, and 
national loyalty (Brunings, 1997). The second is the peoples’ dimension, 
which encompasses local development and the country’s economic gain, ani-
mosity, and country-of-origin effect, which has previously been highlighted 
in the religiosity and anti-Americanism dimension. Nationalism and local 
development and the country’s economic gain dimension have been under-
studied in the context of TNCs. One study by Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, 
Mueller, and Melewar (2001) found that consumer ethnocentrism is fueled by 
patriotism in Turkey, but by nationalism in the Czech Republic. Several cases 
in our study, for instance, SSA, Enron, Lehar Pepsi, and Asia Energy, also cor-
roborate the above finding that nationalism and sentiment for national eco-
nomic gain often affect the internationalization process in the host country.
Nationalism, patriotism, ethnocentrism, and protectionism are more 
likely in the same line that instigates same type of sentiment when mani-
fested. There are two separate notions combined in this concept, nationalism 
and patriotism. Patriotism produces a sense of love of country and socioeco-
nomic gain for its people and the society. In contrast, nationalism emerges 
from a sense of identity, separateness, and superiority as a nation. The latter 
produces a sentiment of deep love and security in shared existence, heri-
tage, flag, language, and roots as a nation. Both cognitive values are socially 
constructed and intertwined with each other. They come to the fore when 
a nation’s wealth is shared, its natural resources are overused and misused 
by foreign entities, and national pride and values are undermined. One facet 
of nationalism is evident in anti-globalization movements, while the other 
is seen in anti-immigration and protectionism movements. Recent anti-FDI 
sentiment and debates in the multi-brand retail sector in India is an example 
of this notion (Sharma, 2012).
Different parts of the world are not equally developed; as a result, the 
faces of nationalism and patriotism tend to be different in different contexts. 
However, these sentiments will not always hamper the activities and entry of 
TNCs; rather, it depends on the strategic approach and commitment of the 
TNCs in the host context and their interactions with sociopolitical agents, 
which produce trust in the market.
Of many events sparked by nationalism and patriotism, the recent 
movement against mining TNCs by the National Committee to Protect Oil, 
Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports in Bangladesh is noteworthy. This 
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committee has organized action against ConocoPhillips, a US-owned TNC 
that recently leased two oil blocks in the Bay of Bengal. The reason for the 
movement and the rising nationalistic sentiment in the population is the per-
ception among civil society members that the national interest of the country 
is not served; instead, ConocoPhillips gets four times more economic benefit 
than Bangladesh itself, even though the oil belongs to Bangladesh. Several 
studies have found that TNCs in extractive industries tend to face these sorts 
of challenges from socio-political markets due to violations of ecological and 
human rights codes, cognitive sentiments, and values, and undermining local 
development (Banks, 2009; Kline, 2005; Muchlinski, 2009).
STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR EARNING AND MAINTAINING 
SOCIO-POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
While the conceptualization of the three sentiments illuminates the causes 
of the sentiments that affect sociopolitical legitimation, this section describes 
eight strategic choices for TNCs to mitigate tensions or benefit from the senti-
ments. Strategic choices that helped TNCs mitigate tensions were identified 
based on six cases that reflect success stories for firms (C-1, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-7, 
C-8). The other three firms—Enron (C-2), SSA (C-4), and Asia Energy (C-9)—
either left the market or went into silent-mode because of severe tensions 
and protests. Very interestingly, the TNCs that failed to earn/maintain socio-
political legitimacy did not follow the strategies outlined in the following.
The tensions caused by the selected sentiments not only damage repu-
tations but also increase transaction costs for firms. Such tensions also tend 
to reduce trust in the relationship between firms and the society of the 
host country. Strategies that TNCs used for mitigating tensions in the socio-
political market are described as follows.
Collaboration Strategy
Collaboration is a common strategy TNCs use to offset the liability of for-
eignness, the liability of newness, and institutional distance. There are two 
important elements within the collaboration strategy. One involves sharing 
ownership with a local partner. By sharing ownership TNCs can rely on the 
acceptance and reputation of their local partners to help them gain their 
own acceptance into society. In collaborative ventures TNCs are often not 
perceived as foreign entities in the society, and their local partners become 
a source of local knowledge and networking with sociopolitical actors. Joint 
venture is the preferred way to execute this strategy, as evident in the cases 
C-1, C-4, C-5, C-7, and C-8. However, strategic alliance is also used in this 
regard. In this kind of collaboration, TNCs do not share ownership, but take 
on local firms as strategic partners.
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The second element of the collaboration strategy is the partnership 
with a local champion or state-owned firm. The local champion can be a 
private company or a non-governmental/non-profit organization. Being a 
“local champion”’ means that the firm possesses a high reputation in the 
business system and holds a leading market share in the relevant sector. In 
case 1, PepsiCo formed a joint venture with Tata, India’s leading business 
group. The JV also included India’s state-owned agriculture firm, Punjab 
Agro Industries, which helped PepsiCo gain legitimacy within the political 
machine and among political actors. Another example from Bangladesh is 
pertinent here. The pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk formed a strate-
gic alliance with Bangladesh Diabetes Association (BADAS) and Transcom 
Limited. BADAS is a non-profit organization that runs the country’s largest 
diabetes clinics in Dhaka, while Transcom is the industry leader in the dis-
tribution sector in Bangladesh and manages Novo Nordisk’s distribution. 
Similarly, Telenor from Norway also entered a JV with Grameen Telecom, 
a not-for-profit venture of Grameen Bank. Strategic alliance has become a 
common strategy in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of 
TNCs, as TNCs tend to make strategic alliances with NGOs and media to 
carry out CSR activities.
In examining TNCs’ use of collaborative strategy it is interesting to note 
that out of four case firms that had full ownership in the host markets, three 
of them failed to legitimize in the context. Only Mecca-Cola (C-6) survived. 
Enron and SSA (C-2, C-3) had to leave the Indian and Bangladeshi markets, 
respectively, while Asia Energy (C-9) went into silent mode and stopped all 
operations in Bangladesh due to rising tensions.
Local Development Strategy
Local development has become an increasingly common strategy in interna-
tional management, where TNCs tend to project an image of promoting local 
development through their ventures and activities. This is an effective strat-
egy in emerging markets where TNCs are perceived to be foreign exploiters, 
and where society’s needs are unmet because of insufficient state initiatives. 
This strategy has two primary implications. One is expressed by a venture’s 
vision that shows greater interest to local development through the initiatives 
of the new venture. The other is reflected by the corporate social responsi-
bility initiatives and the public communication. For example, PepsiCo (C-1) 
showed commitment to setting up agro-processing factories in the Punjab, 
by which it created jobs for locals. It also said it would use agricultural wast-
age and thereby contribute more to the society by offering a good price for 
agricultural products. McDonald’s followed the same strategy and publicly 
trumpeted how much it contributed to social development by expanding its 
value chain in India. The same applies to Mecca-Cola (C-6), which vowed to 
build a factory in each major city in Pakistan to create more jobs for locals. 
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When anti-American sentiment (C-4) ran high in Pakistan during the war in 
Afghanistan, Igloo and KFC showed their commitment to local development 
through media communications, stating how much they contributed to the 
socioeconomic development of Pakistan.
Strategy of Alignment with Sociopolitical Actors
The use of an alignment strategy indicates that TNCs align their missions 
with those of the dominant sociopolitical actors who can instigate tensions 
and who have social power to mitigate tension. Thus, this strategy suggests 
how TNCs can align their activities with the expectations of the sociopolitical 
actors. This can be done by “overt” or “covert” negotiations between TNCs and 
the selected dominant sociopolitical actors. This process can often be danger-
ous if it is not properly managed or implemented. However, this is a good 
strategy for entering an emerging market or regaining legitimacy in the soci-
ety. For example, PepsiCo (C-1) enlisted the support of Sikh religious leaders, 
who lobbied openly on its behalf. PepsiCo also secretly met with the Indian 
government and enlisted its support. In contrast, Enron tried to enlist the 
support of media actors but ultimately failed and was charged with bribery.
Local Name and Staffing Strategy
The local name and staffing strategy is also a common strategy in international 
management. TNCs can take local names in two ways. First, they can use 
a completely local name that has local legitimacy for a new venture; for 
instance, Telenor took the local name “Grameenphone” by forming a JV with 
Grameen Bank. Second, assuming a joint name with a local partner can also 
be an effective strategy, as in Lehar Pepsi (C-1). Having a local name for the 
venture or brand often keeps the venture or brand from being attacked by 
social actors even amid mounting tensions and outcry. When names are from 
the local culture, the firms or brands under those names are not generally 
perceived as foreign entities. However, this only applies as long as TNCs 
keep a low profile for their foreign identity and do not violate the threshold 
legitimating requirements of the sociopolitical actors.
Having local staff, especially a local CEO, at the subsidiary also helps 
TNCs gain sociopolitical legitimacy in the host context. This is because local 
staff can use their own social networks and cognitive linkages to commu-
nicate and position the company in the sociopolitical market. For example, 
GlaxoSmithKline maintains an almost entirely local staff, including CEOs, at 
its subsidiaries in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Hibernation Strategy
Hibernation can be a good strategy in international management when 
sentiments are mounting and TNCs cannot manage them through strategic 
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approaches. Under these circumstances TNCs can keep their businesses low 
profile, opt out of promotion and advertisement, and try to keep silent until 
the adverse reactions die down. For example, TNCs kept a low profile and 
almost stopped advertising while tensions mounted against American brands 
in Pakistan (C-4). Lever Brothers Bangladesh (C-5) also followed this strategy 
when it was accused of violating religious standards by using pig fat in its 
soap products. Being low-profile does not mean that TNCs remain in hiber-
nation for good; rather they can begin compensatory promotion with the 
aim of neutralizing negative sentiments when tensions abate. Asia Energy 
(C-9) is still in hibernation because it has not been able to take appropriate 
measures to reduce the tensions it faces.
Sentiment-Focused Strategy
Sentiment-focused strategy is an effective type of strategy that uses the 
elements that cause tensions in the promotional campaigns to mitigate 
those tensions. This strategy can be used for neutralizing the sentiments 
against the firm or cashing in on the sentiments, meaning positioning the 
company by using the sentiment as an ingredient in its own marketing 
campaigns. For example, PepsiCo (C-1) used patriotic and nationalistic 
feelings to improve its image in Indian society. Mecca-Cola (C-6) tried to 
cash in on religious sentiment by offering the brand name “Mecca” and 
using the slogan “support the Palestine children and legitimate struggle 
for freedom.” Many TNCs, including GSK, Arla, and Nestlé, now proac-
tively focus on environmental protection and carbon mitigation strategies 
along the global value chain and in CSR, in order to counter the ecological 
sentiment.
Isomorphism Strategy
Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population 
to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This indicates that companies tend to follow 
the common norms and practices in business systems (i.e., strategy and 
structures) that other firms do, which stem from pressure from institutions. 
In this strategy, we stress the mimetic isomorphism character in which TNCs 
follow other firms’ strategies in order to neutralize the effects of sentiments 
when their strategies come into conflict with the sentiments of the society. 
In case 4, Igloo, KFC, Nestlé, and other TNCs followed the same slogan—Be 
Pakistani, Buy Pakistani—that local firms were using to cash in on anti-
American sentiment. The TNCs also used the green of the Pakistani flag at 
the product level to show patriotic feeling. Lever Brothers Bangladesh (C-5) 
also mimicked a local firm in using the statement “We use vegetable fat in 
our soap” in its advertising.
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Openness Strategy
Openness strategy is very effective in building or rebuilding trust between 
firms and sociopolitical actors. When sentiments are growing and creating 
tension, TNCs need to pay attention to rebuilding trust in their relation-
ships with social actors. Openness means that TNCs should cooperate with 
sociopolitical actors to give them sufficient information on any alleged prob-
lems. They should also share information with the media and sociopolitical 
actors so that misunderstanding and distrust at the cognitive level is elimi-
nated if it is founded on rumors or false allegations. Third-party investiga-
tions that legitimating actors view as trustworthy often help reduce tension 
and rebuild trust. McDonald’s India (C-7) allowed a public investigation and 
publicly apologized for its mistake. It paid compensation in the form of 
charity. Hindustan Lever (C-8) cooperated with the state investigation team 
and hired an independent international research organization to investigate 
alleged mercury radiation. It also shared information with the media and 
state organizations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We conclude by stating that the REN-sentiment (Religiosity and ideology; 
Ecological balance; and Nationalism and patriotism) causes tensions in the 
process of sociopolitical legitimation of foreign TNCs in South Asia. TNCs 
therefore should understand these sentiments in the host-country context 
prior to formulating strategies for internationalization, ownership structure, 
consumer marketing, recruitment, CSR, and subsidiary management. In order 
to manage such sentiments the previously discussed strategies can be used. 
However, it is not easy to formulate such strategies unless firms have suf-
ficient knowledge of the sentiments and their natures in the local context. 
Based on the findings from the case studies and the literature review, we 
outline a framework (see Table 2) for REN-sentiment that TNCs can take 
into consideration prior to formulating strategies. This framework can guide 
TNCs to understand each sentiment in a particular context.
In line with Lee et al. (2007), we therefore argue that REN-sentiments 
grow when there is a trust gap between TNCs and sociopolitical actors. In 
the same way that TNCs tend to position their products in the consumer mar-
ket, they should also position their identity among sociopolitical actors by 
meeting their expectations and requirements. This can be done by express-
ing commitment through firms’ strategic approaches and actions.
Sentiments evolve and are subject to change over time as the economy, 
technology, and political contexts develop. Activist groups, when acting on 
such sentiments, tend to bring changes in institutions, oppose the existence 
and behavior of TNCs, and threaten sociopolitical legitimation of TNCs (den 
Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Such sentiments tend to emerge frequently in 
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weak institutional contexts that fail to protect the interests of social actors. 
Despite common cultural roots, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are divided 
by political conflict. From the historical point of view, the experience of 
being colonised by outsiders has led them to have a low degree of trust for 
foreigners. This feature of the cognitive institution in South Asian countries 
helps develop sentiments at the society in response to ignorance or violations 
by TNCs. Our study therefore emphasizes the importance of understanding 
historical background and sociopolitical context, particularly sentiments and 
the cognitive institutions. TNCs should pay attention to and gather knowl-
edge on the sentiments as part of sociological and historical phenomena, as 
presented in Table 2. However, REN-typology may be used in other emerg-
ing markets with similar institutional features, and thus further research can 
be undertaken to investigate the applicability of this concept.
TABLE 2 Sentiments (REN) that Affect Sociopolitical Legitimation of TNCs
Dominant 
Sentiments
Abbreviated 
Form (REN) Various Forms and Factors
Religiosity and 
Ideology
R  Religious teachings (e.g., prohibition of interest, 
taboos, dress codes for men and women, prayer 
time and day, code of communication, etc.)
 Religious or ideological beliefs and assumptions 
toward society, economy, and politics
 Value for religious and ideological scripts, idols, 
monuments, and celebrations
 Religious and ideological hostility/animosity or 
friendliness
 Sense of religious and/or ideological identity 
threat
Ecological 
Sentiment
E Sense of ecological balance
 Damage to environment that directly affects 
human-life, survival, and climate change
 Value for solutions to environmental problems 
and social betterment
Value of nutrition, hygiene, and safety 
Nationalism 
and 
Patriotism
N Pride in nationality and the national heritage
Value for national/ethnic identity
 Value for national heritage and monuments, 
flags, songs, languages, historical events, and 
heroes
 Value for national economic interest, benefit, and 
development (any sort of innovation or techno-
logical advancement, investment, productivity, 
or value creation that improves the quality of 
life and socioeconomic advancement)
 Patriotism: love for the nation, rivalry in terms of 
national identity with other nations
 Political rivalry and animosity with other nations 
(as nation state or national identity)
 Value for indigenous people’s rights, heritage, and 
survival
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IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
This inductive concept, REN-sentiment, has two major implications for inter-
national management. One is for strategy formulation and the other is for 
corporate value development in sociopolitical contexts in emerging econo-
mies. Future research can be pursued to test these sentiments using qualita-
tive and quantitative studies in other emerging markets.
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APPENDIX
FACTORS THAT CREATE SENTIMENTS AND AFFECT SOCIOPOLITICAL LEGITIMATION OF 
TNCS IN SOUTH ASIA (DATA CODED FROM THE NINE CASES)
Sentiments/ 
Case Religiosity Ideology Ecology Nationalism Patriotism
(C-1) Anti-American 
sentiment
Job creation, use 
of local agro-
producers 
and reduction 
of their 
wastage, CIA 
connection 
may 
undermine 
independence, 
import would 
affect the 
balance of 
payment.
Forced to take 
local name 
with Pepsi 
insignia, joint 
venture with 
local and 
govt. firms, 
local expertise 
would be 
undermined. 
(C-2) Bribery, 
corporate 
fraud
Import of raw 
materials 
from outside, 
imposing 
high price, 
undue 
influence 
from U.S. 
govt.
Not using 
local cheap 
resource: coal.
(C-3) Ideological 
standpoint 
against 
foreign 
ownership 
of port
Fear of losing 
job, anti-
American 
sentiment/
perception 
of U.S. 
domination, 
national 
identity issue 
for opposition 
political party.
Nation’s foreign 
trade would 
be controlled 
by the U.S.-
owned port.
(C-4) Feeling of 
religious 
identity 
threat, 
anti-Islamic 
sentiment 
from U.S.
Anti-American 
sentiment 
caused by 
the wars 
in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
Showing how 
and to what 
extent TNCs 
contribute to 
the Pakistani 
society and 
economy, use 
of flag, use 
of the green 
color of the 
national flag.
Spread “Be 
Pakistani” 
feeling, 
emotion for 
the homeland.
(Contiuned)
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CONTINUED
Sentiments/ 
Case Religiosity Ideology Ecology Nationalism Patriotism
(C-5) Violated 
religious 
value, Halal 
issue.
(C-6) Brand name: 
”Mecca”—a 
religious 
symbol, 
support 
Palestinian 
struggle-
Muslim 
brotherhood 
feeling, offer 
substitute 
based on 
religious 
ideology, 
launched in 
holy month 
of Ramadan.
Ideological 
stand 
against 
Israeli 
occupation 
and 
support 
for 
humanitar-
ian work.
Promise to set 
up several 
factories to 
create jobs 
in Pakistan.
(C-7) Violated 
religious 
value of 
Hindus, donate 
to religious 
welfare 
organizations 
as compensa-
tion, offered 
beef- and 
pork-free 
menu, 
allowed 
public 
investigation.
Violated 
vegetarians’ 
faith and 
ideological 
values, 
offered 
vegetarian 
menu.
Job and small 
business 
creation 
throughout 
the value 
chain.
(C-8) Lack of 
corporate 
responsi-
bility.
Mercury
radiation, 
environmental 
pollution
(C-9) Forced to 
leave 
forefathers’ 
land—a 
social 
identity 
threat.
Open-pit 
method 
damaged the 
cultivable 
land and 
surface 
drinking 
water, 
weather 
pollution, 
save the 
forest.
Country 
should be 
the owner of 
the mine, no 
replacement 
plan for 
agriculture 
and 
rehabilitation.
Country gets 
lower return 
against the 
damages 
caused and 
the resources 
taken, low 
compensation 
package 
offered.
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